The federal Department of Energy has released its implementation plan for the environmental impact statement that is to address management options for dealing with spent nuclear fuel being stored at Pearl Harbor and other naval installations.
The plan calls for preparation of a two-volume EIS. The first volume is to address management of spent nuclear fuel, while the second is to address the clean-up of DOE facilities at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, where spent nuclear fuel has been shipped and stored for decades. (The waste involves not only spent fuel from the Navy’s nuclear submarines and from the DOE’s reactors that were part of the nation’s nuclear weapons production system, but also fuel rods from a reactor in Shippingport, Pennsylvania one of the earliest commercial nuclear power plants as well as the melted mess of the core of Three Mile Island Unit 2. The Three Mile Island “spent nuclear fuel remnants,” as the implementation plan describes the waste, was accepted by the Department of Energy for purposes of research, the department said at the time. In general, however, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory EIS will not address spent fuel from commercial nuclear reactors. That waste is instead to be shipped to a separate DOE facility, planned for construction in Nevada.)
The implementation plan anticipates the EIS building upon a number of component studies. One of those studies is to be an environmental assessment covering the short-term storage of spent nuclear fuel at Pearl Harbor. As Environment Hawai’i reported in September, the shipment of spent fuel from Pearl Harbor to INEL has been halted since the end of June by the order of a federal judge, which bars further shipments of radioactive waste to INEL until the EIS he ordered is completed. As a part of a court-ordered settlement agreed to in August, the Navy is to prepare an EA for the short-term storage of nuclear waste at its facilities (including Pearl Harbor) by the end of 1993. According to David B. Knox of the Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, that EA is in preparation and is expected to be completed on time. It was not available for review by press time, however.
Navy Plans Treatment Of Mixed Radioactive Waste
What do you get when radioactive waste is also chemically hazardous? The technical name for the blend is mixed waste, and Pearl Harbor has lots of it.
Until 1987, the Navy did little to handle waste in a fashion that would minimize the generation of mixed waste. Since then, the Navy has stated in a letter to Jeffrey Zelikson, the director of hazardous waste management for Region IX of the Environmental Protection Agency, that “The Shipyard has taken actions to eliminate hazardous constituents from being introduced into radiological work processes to the maximum extent practical.”
How much mixed waste is being stored at Pearl Harbor?
According to documents submitted to the EPA, in 1992, there were at least 2,500 pounds of mixed waste being stored in Building 1384 at the shipyard.
Those same documents, however, as well as the Navy letter to Zelikson, dated June 29, 1992, anticipate the generation each year of an additional 5,000 pounds of mixed waste.
In the letter to Zelikson, Captain R.E. Kell, shipyard commander, states that the shipyard had recently added to its inventory of mixed waste about four gallons of liquid waste containing the solvent trichloroethane. “The shipyard has no plans or current processes which would generate more of this type of waste,” Kell stated. Still, in an attached application for a permit to store hazardous waste, “we have included item 36… identifying a production rate of 500 pounds per year of trichloroethane.”
Kell goes on to say that, although the shipyard “has no current processes that generate … mixed waste streams, there is a slight chance that one or more of these mixed waste streams may be produced. Therefore, PHNS has added items 49 through 58 [to the application] in order to identify other potential mixed waste streams…” Altogether, Kell’s application anticipates the annual generation of some 7,500 pounds of mixed waste at the shipyard and the nearby submarine base – in other words, each year the shipyard would generate three times as much as it has generated in all the years since it began operations.
In October 1993, the Navy prepared a “Conceptual Site Treatment Plan” for mixed radioactive and hazardous waste at Pearl Harbor shipyard. Preparation of the plan was required as a result of the Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992.
That document presents a somewhat different picture of the quantities of mixed waste stored at the shipyard as well as the volume expected to be generated over the next four years.
According to that plan, the Navy now store 2,262 kilograms (roughly 5,000 pounds) of mixed waste at Pearl Harbor – nearly all of which (2,185 kg) consists of solidified chromate solution.
Over the next four years, the Navy anticipates generating 550 kilograms of mixed waste containing “chromium and lead-based paint chips”; 125 kilograms of “solid waste contaminated with chromate,” and 25 kilograms of “lead-contaminated debris.”
Most of the waste to be generated comes from paint removed from radioactive surfaces and from the decontamination of lead-shielded items.
The conceptual plan includes a description of ways in which the various types of mixed waste might be treated or stabilized for long-term storage. For some types of mixed waste, no satisfactory treatment method exists, although the plan describes several technologies that are said to have promise. Nearly all of the processes, existing or promised, involve treatment at sites on the continental United States. For every type of mixed waste identified, however, the plan states that the shipyard “plans to evaluate commercial treatment options for this waste stream, including commercial on-site treatment…”
The conceptual plan is to be followed with a draft Site Treatment Plan. Copies of the conceptual plan are available at the Pearl Harbor, Pearl City, and Aiea libraries. Comments on the plan should be directed to Annette M. Campbell, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, 401 Avenue E, Suite 124, Pearl Harbor, Hawai’i 96860-5350. Campbell may also be reached by telephone at 474-0272.
Civilian Radiographers Cited for Violations
The handling of nuclear materials is a problem not only for the Navy, but for several Hawai’i firms as well.
As we reported in 1992, a federal grand jury indicted Gordon Finlay and Finlay Testing Laboratories of Honolulu, alleging they had engaged in a criminal conspiracy to cover up their failure to exercise due caution in the transportation of nuclear materials, in addition to other charges. That case went to trial and resulted in a conviction. Sentencing of Gordon Finlay, company owner, is set for February.
Finlay surrendered his Nuclear Regulatory Commission license in 1988. Before then, however, his company was one of almost 200 testing laboratories around the country that use nuclear materials, in hand-held devices called “sources” or cameras, to test metal structures for cracks and other defects that are not visible to the eye. The entire process is called radiography, and because its practice is inherently dangerous, it is strictly regulated by the NRC.
While the case against Finlay is the first to involve criminal charges, the NRC has issued notices of violation against two other licensed radiographers in Hawai’i: Fewell Geotechnical Engineering, Ltd., and C&R Laboratories, both of Pearl City.
The notice of violation and civil penalties against Fewell are the more serious. The notice of violation stems from an inspection that occurred October 4, 1990, and a follow-up inspection later in the month. NRC inspectors determined that an employee of Fewell, Thomas E. Murray, failed to comply with several safety requirements. In a subsequent interview, the NRC inspectors determined that Murray – an alumnus of the Navy’s nuclear program, by the way – both knew of the requirements and lied about his failure to comply with them. The NRC immediately ordered Fewell to cease employing Murray “in NRC licensed activities for a period of three years”. (Murray was eligible to apply for authority to do radiography in October of this year. According to the NRC regional office, he has not done so.)
NRC Region V Administrator John B. Martin wrote Fewell on February 7, 1991: “Some of the violations appear to have been willfully committed by one of your radiographers and represented a significant threat to the health and safety of the radiographer, helper personnel…, and members of the public.” The violations, Martin continued, “demonstrate a significant lack of adequate management attention to, and oversight of your licensed activities. The radiographer employee who was responsible for certain of the violations … significantly degraded radiation safety and directly threatened public health and safety, including his own… However, as the licensee, you are in part responsible for these actions.” The violations, taken together, “constitute a very significant regulatory concern,” which Martin classified “in the aggregate as a Severity Level II problem” (Level I being the most severe). Civil penalties totaling $20,000 were assessed against Fewell.
In May of 1993, the NRC issued a notice of violation to C&R Laboratories. An employee had been determined to be wearing an alarm that did not meet NRC regulations, a Severity Level III violation. In addition, the lab used shipping containers that failed to conform to NRC specifications and did not provide employees with the periodic training required under the NRC license. C&R quickly corrected the problems and no penalties were assessed.
Plutonium Shipment Raises Concerns, GAO Finds
The General Accounting Office, Congress’ auditor, has weighed in with its report on the first shipment of plutonium to Japan made under the 1988 Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Japan Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. Senator John Glenn, chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, asked the GAO to prepare the report, which was released in June 1993.
The plutonium shipment1 arrived in Tokai, Japan, following a two-month voyage from Cherbourg, France. The Akatsuki Maru, the ship carrying the plutonium, was accompanied by an armed escort ship, the Shikishima.
The U.S.-Japan agreement provides for the shipment of plutonium extracted from spent fuel rods removed from Japanese commercial reactors. The origin of the fuel rods is the United States. The agreement requires Japan to notify the United States State Department before each transfer of plutonium and to provide the United States with a transportation plan that includes a “threat assessment and a contingency plan.”
According to the GAO report, “the United States can stop the shipment only if (1) it determines that such transfers would pose a threat to national security and/or (2) there is proof that the transfers will significantly increase the risk of proliferation of nuclear materials.”
Some environmental groups were worried that the equipment to be used in the transport was not adequate. The GAO report states, “U.S. officials agreed that the two ships carried the best and most technologically advanced equipment available… The ship was double-hulled and equipped with special fire-fighting, radiation safety, navigation, and communications equipment. In addition, the ship’s on-board cranes, used to lift the hatch covers sealing the storage area within the ship, were rendered inoperable so that the containers of plutonium could not be removed during transport.” The escort ship “was equipped with two helicopters, two speedboats, dual rapid-fire 33 mm gun turrets fore and aft and 20 mm vulcan guns port and starboard.”
A Missing Report
The GAO notes that, “Because of concerns about the November 1992 shipment to Japan, the Congress, in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486), which was signed on October 24, 1992, required the president, in consultation with the NRC, to conduct a study of the safety of shipments of plutonium by sea. The study was to determine (1) the safety of the containers holding the plutonium; (2) the safety risks to the states of such shipments; (3) upon the request of a state, the adequacy of that state’s emergency plans with respect to such shipments; and (4) the federal resources needed to assist the states on account of such shipments. Furthermore, the president was to submit the report with his recommendations no later than 60 days after the act’s enactment.
The GAO obtained a draft of the report. It “concluded that plutonium could be shipped safely by sea when shipments were carried out in compliance with existing international and national regulations.” However, the draft “did not contain an evaluation by NRC of the containers used for shipping the plutonium.” In addition, the draft “concluded that no federal resources were needed to assist the states in preparing an appropriate response to an accident involving plutonium.”
But while the draft was available, no final report has evidently been prepared. “As of May 1993,” the GAO states, “the report had not been submitted to Congress.”
Proliferation Worries
The GAO report raises concerns on two levels: First, there’s the general concern that the processing of plutonium is creating an increase in global stocks of the element that could be destabilizing to world peace. Second, there is the concern that the U.S.-Japan agreement might set an unfortunate precedent for future bilateral agreements between the U S. and other countries.
As to the proliferation concern, the GAO report states that, “According to [the Department of Defense’s] former Deputy for Non-Proliferation Policy, the risks of proliferation posed by reprocessing and separated plutonium under international safeguards are unacceptable. Similarly, British government officials told us that while environmental and economic issues surrounding reprocessing are important, proliferation is a major concern.” The GAO report notes that, from 1987 to 1992, stocks of plutonium held by [British Nuclear Fuels Limited] and its overseas customers steadily increased from 14 metric tons to 23.5 metric tons.” By the year 2000, it says, commercial reactors will have generated spent fuel “containing over 1,100 metric tons of plutonium.” All that is required to manufacture an atomic bomb is about 8 kilograms of plutonium in its metallic form.
As to the second concern – that of precedent set by the U.S.-Japan Agreement, the GAO notes that in past agreements (with Norway, Finland, and Sweden), these countries must give the United States advance notice of 15 legislative days in which Congress can consider the planned shipment. “By providing for consent on a case-by-case basis, these agreements allow the United States to consider whether the return of plutonium will take place under conditions that ensure timely warning of any diversion well in advance of the time at which a non-nuclear weapon state could transform the material into a nuclear explosive device.”
The GAO continues: “The agreement between the United States and Japan went well beyond these precedents by also including prior consent for 30 years for the return of separated plutonium to Japan.” The agreement gives Japan blanket approval for the reprocessing and return of plutonium and “leaves the United States with little effective control over these activities for the 30-year life of the agreement.”
“No other country has such an agreement with the United States,” the GAO notes. “However, other agreements concerning nonproliferation and the transportation of nuclear materials will be coming up for consideration before the Congress, and these agreements may incorporate similar language.”
The former Defense Department deputy for non-proliferation policy “stated that by persisting in its plutonium use policy, Japan set a bad precedent for North and South Korea that will complicate U.S. discussions on reprocessing with them.”
“At the same time,” the GAO report goes on to say, “both France’s Cogema and the United Kingdom’s BNFL” – the two companies with which Japan has contracted to extract plutonium from its spent fuel – “have offices in Seoul, South Korea, whose main objective is to sell reprocessing services and technology…. The United States is monitoring this situation.”2
Fruit Irradiator On the Comeback Trail?
Some years back, the state government proposed construction of a papaya irradiation facility to help Hawai’i’s papaya growers market their fruit abroad. The idea was that the irradiator would kill insect larvae, ensuring better quality fruit and an end to concerns (in California and elsewhere) that imports of Hawai’i produce would increase the risk of the introduction of damaging pests.
The state published an environmental impact statement for the irradiation facility, to be based in Hilo, near the airport. While the state bore some of the costs of design, however, it was not going to build the facility itself, leaving that to market forces.
As it turned out, no private developer thought the investment would be worthwhile, and, as a result, the irradiation facility EIS has done little more than collect dust in the last four years.
Now, however, officials at the Department of Agriculture have indicated a renewed interest in getting the facility built. At the September 29, 1993, meeting of the Governor’s Agriculture Coordinating Committee, Lyle Wong of the Department of Agriculture’s Plant Industry Division, reported that irradiation was essential to expanding markets for tropical fruit. According to the minutes of that meeting, Wong stated: we cannot push for an expansion of our tropical fruit industry without an effective commodity treatment, which is irradiation.” Wong was reported to be working with the Office of State Planning to draft a bill “to provide seed money to look at a feasibility study.” This, the minutes continue, “would be for a research demonstration facility to position ourselves to be part of that process.”
In an interview in December, Wong said that the minutes reflected pretty well what was said at the September meeting. Since then, however, the idea of drafting a bill for a feasibility study has been dropped.
Wong explained that he was considering irradiation as a treatment for the range of tropical fruit crops – mangoes, longans, lychees, carambola, rambutan, and custard apples, to name a few – for which no treatment protocol is currently available that would make these commodities available for export. Irradiation might be a means of making these crops marketable, he said, although he added that the same forces that brought the papaya irradiator to a halt – public opposition, cost, the availability of alternatives – remain “legitimate concerns.”
Irradiation is being pursued in Florida and Iowa, he said, and he is looking into the experiences of those states to better understand whether irradiation might be appropriate for Hawai’i crops.
“I’m not walking away from irradiation just because of perceived problems with the technology,” he said.
1 For background, see Environment Hawai`i, July 1992, [url=/members_archives/archives_more.php?id=870_0_32_0_C]”Hawai`i is left in Dark on Plans for Cross-Pacific Plutonium Shipments”[/url].
2 All quotations are from the General Accounting Office, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: Japan’s Shipment of Plutonium Raises Concerns About Reprocessing,” GAO/RCED-93-154, June 1993.
— Patricia Tummons
Volume 4, Number 7 January 1994
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