It was a dark and stormy night…
The setting may be a cliche, but little else is in the scenario developed by the Coast Guard to describe what it calls a “reasonable worse-case” scenario for an oil spill in Hawai`i. Unlike many worst-case imaginings, the situation outlined by the Coast Guard, set forth in its Contingency Plan for the Pacific Island areas, does not require any willing suspension of disbelief to think it may happen. To return to the scene:
The time is 3:30 in the morning, and Kona winds are whipping up high waves in the Ka`iwi Channel between Moloka`i and O`ahu. Rain storms have reduced visibility to near zero. A supertanker, 920 feet long and carrying 29.4 million gallons of crude oil, collides with a large container ship headed in the opposite direction. At once, crude oil begins spilling onto the choppy water. Before the bleeding is stanched, the tanker has lost 9.8 million gallons — a third of its cargo.
After the collision, “some of the heaviest portions of the oil would be driven below the surface of the water. In addition, the sinking effect would increase with time as the oil weathers and lighter fractions evaporate. Tracking the movement of subsurface oil would be extremely difficult… Booming operations would be only about 30 percent effective…
“[T]he surface slick could easily move towards O`ahu and impact Makapu`u Point within eight hours. Moreover, subsurface currents could move oil that sank below the surface to the same area in less than four hours… The vast size of the slick would eventually blanket both the windward and leeward shores, very possibly impacting the west shore if oil became trapped in near-shore tidal currents or eddies… Oil would likely impact the island of Kaua`i within less than four days and the island of Ni`ihau within five days… There would be the potential of tarballs impacting the Northwest Hawai`i Islands… among the most important seabird nesting colonies in the world … [which] are considered to be extremely sensitive to oil spills.”
“…We would expect O`ahu beaches to be re-oiled daily throughout the cleanup process by tidal influences and eddy effects on oil pockets in bays and coves… Shoreline cleanup would be extremely difficult, particularly in those areas where there are exposed rocky shores and vertical seawalls and limited or no access routes by vehicles.
“Offshore containment and removal of oil would in most cases be impractical due to high winds and seas causing ‘splashover’ on booms and unreasonable risks to the safety of personnel.
“The length of time needed to respond and cleanup a spill of this magnitude would be on the order of 10-16 months.”
The Response
Under the federal National Contingency Plan, the Coast Guard has the responsibility to monitor oil spills. It also has the option of taking charge of cleanup operations, a process known as federalizing the spill. The Coast Guard scenario calls for federalization of this spill. (With passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, discussed in this issue, federalization of all major spills is likely.)
An all-out alert is made for equipment, gear and personnel. The Navy supervisor of salvage is asked to help, and tugs are requested of Pearl Harbor Naval Station, Hawaiian Tug and Barge and Sause Brothers. The Coast Guard asks its Pacific Strike Team (on the West Coast) to fly out all available boom and skimming equipment. The National Marine Fisheries Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service are asked to set up a bird rescue center at Sealife Park and to provide information on wildlife impact.
It is “impossible to rely on mechanical methods of containment and recovery to control this spill. Therefore, the FOSC [federal officer in charge] would initiate actions to apply dispersants…”
Would dispersants actually be applied, however? That’s doubtful. “Pre-authorization for the use of dispersants has been granted to the FOSC [federal on-scene coordinator] subject to certain conditions,” the Coast Guard scenario notes. “Approximately 3,500 gallons of EPA-approved COREXIT 9527 dispersant is available on O`ahu. This small amount of dispersant is insufficient to handle a large spill and at least another 50,000 gallons of dispersant would have to be ordered from the mainland to disperse a significant portion of the slick. Considering time constraints, most of the oil would have already impacted O`ahu before dispersants could be used…” Given that the chief reason for employing dispersants is to avoid having the oil reach land, given that the time frame for dispersants’ effectiveness is very small, and, finally, given also the controversy over using dispersants in any case, the actual use of dispersants is not likely.
Nor is it likely that the “burning response option” would be employed. “Generally the following criteria would have to be met” for burning, the Contingency Plan states: the oil must be three to four inches thick, with little of its lighter fractions (the more volatile part) having evaporated; strong trade winds need to be blowing in a southwesterly direction away from O`ahu (a rare wind pattern for the area of this imagined spill); and the spill must be at least five nautical miles away from land at its closest point. Also, no burning can occur if search-and-rescue operations are under way or if efforts are continuing to transfer the unspilled portion of the oil to another vessel (so-called lightering operations).
In the Coast Guard scenario, “by the time lightering operations and search-and-rescue are completed, it would be too late to use the burning option because the major oil impact on beaches would already have taken place and most of the lighter fractions would likely have already evaporated for the remaining slick.”
Boom Times
The Coast Guard, working with other federal and state agencies, develops a priority list for cleaning up affected coastal areas, “based on degree of oil impact, public health, community resources, sensitive environments, commercial and recreational resources.” That list would include (among others areas), Hanauma Bay, Coconut Island, Pearl Harbor National Wildlife Refuge, Waikiki Diamond Head shoreline fisheries management area, Pupukea Marine Life Conservation District, Ulupau wildlife management area, and Paiko Lagoon.
Another priority list is developed for “high use” areas, including Honolulu Harbor, Ke`ehi Lagoon, Kewalo Basin, Waikiki Beach, Maunalua, Waimanalo, Kailua and Kaneohe bays, Haleiwa Harbor, and Pokai Bay.
All totaled, the Coast Guard estimates that on O`ahu alone, there are approximately 120 miles (633,600 feet) of sensitive coastline areas. Protecting them entails, at the least, placing booms offshore.
“Cleanup contractors, federal agencies, and state agencies on the island could provide approximately 11,600 feet of containment boom in 24 hours, and 4,900 feet of additional boom in 48 hours. This totals 16,500 feet of boom, or just 2.6 percent of what is needed… All additional boom needed would have to be brought in from the mainland or foreign sources.”
Even if the boom were on hand, deploying it requires boats — and those, too, are in short supply. “On the first day of the spill, contractors could put 10 work boats (tugs) on scene,” the scenario states. “This is a shortage of 30 work boats/vessels of opportunity.” The needed number would double by the second day. By the end of the second week, “we would likely have around 100 work boats/VO onscene, of which 80 would be contracted from local recreational, fishing and charter boats located in the Hawaiian Islands. We estimate the required number of work boats/VO to be 160 by the end of the first two weeks.”
Paradise Lost?
In the year since this scenario was written, Congress has passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The American Petroleum Industry has developed a national oil spill response plan, which includes a so-called Deployed Response Group in Hawai`i, involving equipment, several permanent personnel, and a response vessel. The local oil-spill response cooperative, the Clean Islands Council, has beefed up its store of booms, skimmers and boats — most recently with the addition of a new vessel outfitted with yet more booms, skimmers, and dispersant.
But if a supertanker should break apart in Hawaiian waters tomorrow, the Coast Guard’s worse-case scenario would be played out with little meaningful change. Precious wetland areas, irreplaceable marine sanctuaries, miles of beaches and dozens of tourist resorts would be hit by wave after wave of oil — first the heavy, tarry crude, then the mix of water and heavy oil fractions called mousse. Clean-up operations would continue for the next 12 months at least.
Volume 1, Number 6 December 1990